Netizens-Digest Sunday, March 23 2003 Volume 01 : Number 440 Netizens Association Discussion List Digest In this issue: [netz] Talleyrand, Intelligence Analysis Methods and Netizenship [netz] A delicate line? Re: [netz] A delicate line? Re: [netz] A delicate line? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2003 10:26:51 -0500 From: "Howard C. Berkowitz" Subject: [netz] Talleyrand, Intelligence Analysis Methods and Netizenship New French diplomats going to their assignments, it has been said, received their final briefings from the great diplomatic mind of Talleyrand. "Above all, no zeal," was the key message. He didn't mean not to be active, but to be objective and dispassionate. So I'd like to give some basic information on the intelligence process, as raw material about how more objectivity can enter a net-world of storm and fury. At the end of this message are some postings to other lists that may serve as reference material: a primer on intelligence organizations and a reading list. I'll mention a few specifics to start some discussion of how some techniques might apply to Netizen activities. The Registry - ------------ Certainly going back to the 1930s, and quite possibly going back to Sir Francis Walsingham in 1518, the "Registry" or "biographic registry" is an unglamorous but critical tool in ensuring reliable intelligence. Whenever an individual comes to the attention of an analytic organization, their name is checked against an existing index, to see if they have been in direct or indirect contact before. By indirect contact, you might learn that while someone has never been in contact with you, they show up as the next-door neighbor of local spy ring leaders from country XXX, in different cities, over 20 years. Now, this immediately can get criticized as "surveillance." But like so much else, it's a double-edged sword. Typically, a new source that has no registry information is assigned a reliability rating of "not yet determined," or a basic mid-level rating based on other factors. If contacts are identified, the reliability goes down if there is reason to believe the source may be a proxy for other interests, or up if the contacts are themselves trusted and will vouch for the new source. Wiring Diagrams - --------------- Registries are fundamentally name-oriented, although they may use a wide range of techniques to manage spelling variations, name changes, aliases, and deliberate deception. A closely related function, once some group (e.g., a foreign government) is identified to be of interest, is to develop a "wiring diagram" that focuses on the relationships among individuals and, where possible, job functions. Such diagrams get studied over time, and often provide input into developing true biographies. They also often provide a template for pattern recognition of, say, intelligence officers of a given country, differentiating the diplomats from the "spies" (hey, diplomats are merely legal spies, among other things, if they are doing their job well). Compartmented Information Management of Human Sources - ----------------------------------------------------- In general terms, it's often necessary, if you have a sensitive source of information that could be lost if revealed, the intelligence organization's data about this source is split into several separately controlled but coordinated pieces. Actual sources (e.g., spy) and their identities are extremely closely held. The individuals may have registry entries, but the basic registry should have no clue as to their actual assignment. Those with a need to know have ways of getting to the detailed information. The most closely held source files identify the true name of the source, the way the source was acquired, means of communicating with the source, etc. These files point to, but do not include, the information learned from the source. Typically, they establish a cryptonym (e.g., IRONBARK-9) that is used in other references to material to the agent -- the true name is as closely held as possible. There may be multiple and/or changing cryptonyms. Organized by cryptonym are files of all information received from a source. While these do not contain the true name, they are still extremely sensitive, because even a moderately competent analyst often can work out the identity from a career pattern and elimination of people that did not have access to all information in the file. Most information available to analysts are in subject-oriented files of varying sensitivity. The greater the sensitivity, the easier it is to identify the source. A highly sensitive file might identify certain former Soviet missile details as from IRONBARK 9. A less, but still sensitive, file might be a little less specific about the information, and describe it as coming from "a senior Soviet officer of the General Staff, from whom we have received generally accurate information". At the next level of sensitivity, the data might be combined with that of other sources and be identified as "collected material from several usually accurate sources in the Soviet government." Why this emphasis on security? ============================== I'm simply trying to give some perspective on why things get censored, or all information may not be public. It is equally important to a journalist or intelligence agency to protect their sources, but it is also essential that the consumers of their reporting apply quality control checks before accepting it as gospel. =========================================================== From: Howard Berkowitz Newsgroups: alt.war.nuclear.biological-chemical-radiological-moderated To: alt-war-nuclear-biological-chemical-radiological-moderated@moderators.isc.org Subject: Intelligence Organization User-Agent: MT-NewsWatcher/3.0 (PPC) Date: Sun, 19 Jan 2003 12:51:16 -0500 Message-ID: Given there have been a number of questions about what makes up "intelligence" and resources about them, I threw this draft together. It does not include paramilitary or other special operations. I realize I've overreported the number of techniques in collection -- there are just as many in analysis, but they often are much more specialized or don't break out as easily. You can look at it as a "toolbox" rather than a description of any specific organization. As it is, there's a lot of blurring between collection platforms and sensors. An EP-3, for example, carries ELINT and COMINT sensors, and may also have MASINT and IMINT. I'm going to follow this with a draft reading list. Collection Collection Guidance and Tasking HUMINT Diplomatic reporting, including attaches Covert assets (usually "spies", but include couriers, support, etc.) Debriefing of travelers Agent support Cover, documents, finance, records Open Source Intelligene (OSINT) Broadcast monitoring (Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service) Books, journals Open consultation with experts Electronic Intelligence (targeted at non-communications intentional signals, such as radar frequencies) Platforms Manned airborne (EP-3, EC/RC-135, U-2, and tactical) Unmanned Airborne Seaborne (CLASSIC OUTBOARD) Ground intercept stations Space based systems Low orbit Medium orbit Geosynchronous and higher orbit Sensor type Communications Intelligence Platforms Manned Airborne (EP-3, EC/RC-135, U-2, and tactical) Unmanned Airborne Seaborne (e.g., CLASSIC OUTBOARD) Ground intercept stations Space based systems Low orbit Medium orbit Geosynchronous and higher orbitDirection finding Methods Traffic analysis Cryptanalysis Interception through other technical means (acoustic, compromising electronic interception) "Practical cryptanalysis" -- stealing or buying cryptomaterials Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) -- covers lots of things that aren't SIGINT or IMINT. Non-intentional electronic emissions intercept (e.g., sidelobes) Acoustic collection Non-imaging infrared (e.g., DSP) Seismic collection Environmental sampling (e.g., fallout, CW/BW byproducts) Magnetic (e.g., MAD) Nuclear intelligence Radio frequency/EMP Electro-optical (can go under imaging) Directed energy device sensors Chemical spectroscopy Remote laser measurement Radar measurement Geodesy and mapping Imaging intelligence collection Airborne, seaborne, ground, and space systems Photographic (light and infrared), imaging radar Onsite inspection for arms control Analysis Basic Reference Current Intelligence/Watch Center Biographical Registry (name index used in counterintelligence/counterespionage) Economic Scientific Technical analysis of foreign weapon systems Arms control/nonproliferation Order of Battle Weather Imagery Interpretation Medical and Psychological Organizational, especially for transnational/non-national Estimates and Reporting Intelligence estimates (broad) and Special National Intelligence Estimates Equipment handbooks Intelligence Annexes to military operations plans Indications & Warnings lists Specialized publications (Bombing Encyclopedia, electronic signature handbooks) Policy-level briefings and "classified newspapers & magazines" - -------------- From: Howard Berkowitz Newsgroups: alt.books.tom-clancy Subject: Intelligence Bibliography User-Agent: MT-NewsWatcher/3.0 (PPC) Date: Sun, 19 Jan 2003 17:17:56 -0500 Again following up on various questions, don't assume a given book or reference falls into only one category. Substantive Online Sources - -------------------------- http://www.fas.org http://www.odci.gov www.cia.gov/csi/studies/ Declassified "Studies in Intelligence," the internal professional journal http://www.adtdl.army.mil/atdls.htm Army online library. Lots of manuals. In addition to intelligence documents, get Staff Officers FM http://www.nsa.gov http://www.cryptome.org Academic curricula - ------------------ http://www.c4i.org/teachintel.html http://intellit.muskingum.edu/refmats_folder/refmatsteaching.html Strategic/Policy Interaction - ---------------------------- Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence and American Foreign Policy Richard Helms, The Man Who Kept The Secrets Colby, Lost Victory Marchetti & Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence Organizational - -------------- Richelson, The American Intelligence Community (2nd Ed) Prouty, The Secret Team (highly critical of US intelligence) Kirkpatrick, The US Intelligence Community Agee (highly critical and intended as an expose, but quite detailed on field station organization and procedures Cryptology & Communications intelligence (not especially mathematical) - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Kahn, The Codebreakers (get the used 1st ed if you can -- he added very, very little to the 2nd) Friedman's declassified Military Cryptanalysis Cryptologia, a quarterly journal Smith, Internet Cryptography www.nsa.gov for historical work -- VENONA is especially interesting Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret Counterintelligence/Counterespionage - ------------------------------------ West, Molehunt (British orientation) Wise, Molehunt (US orientation) Winterbotham, The Double-Cross System Agee, Inside the Company Pincher, Their Trade is Treachery General analytical - ------------------ Adams, War of Numbers Hilsman, To Move a Nation Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Analysis and Decision Layton, I Was There Allen, War Games Military intelligence - --------------------- Used to be a fair amount of branch organization in the Staff Officers' Field Guide, which has been renumbered. See ATDL online library--some intelligence field manuals are available Interrogation - ------------- Sedgwick Tourson, Conversations with Victor Charlie (also quite good on order of battle analysis) Overhead recon (aircraft and satellite) & special sensors - --------------------------------------------------------- Dino Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball Lindgren, Trust but Verify: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War Dwayne Allen Day et al (eds), CORONA Burrows, Deep Black Sontag et al, Blind Man's Bluff Tradecraft - ---------- Wise, Molehunt (US molehunting) West, Molehunt (British) www.odci.gov -- search for Penkovsky and IRONBARK Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Special Warfare Sudoplatov, Special Tasks Prange, Target Tokyo: The Sorge Spy Ring Perrault, The Red Orchestra ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2003 23:32:52 -0500 From: "Howard C. Berkowitz" Subject: [netz] A delicate line? I've seen reporting of an incident that challenges on multiple levels. 1. What are the boundaries of "the net" with respect to netizenship? Are commercial television and radio part of the net? We can certainly communicate with them electronically as never in the past, with email feedback. 2. What are the lines of demanding "content correctness" from a source of information? Where do freedom of expression and of journalistic (including alternate media) integrity arise? Here's the situation, to which I do _not_ have any easy answer, but think it's just marginally within scope. It's definitely not my intention to discuss the specific content being discussed, but the process of creation and distribution of content, and the freedom given to producers of content. News reports today cite about 1500 protesters in front of CNN Headquarters in Atlanta, criticizing CNN for "glorifying war." Now, I don't have one key bit of information: were the demonstrators sitting in or otherwise blocking access to the CNN building? There was also a protest at CNN's Los Angeles bureau (http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/22/sprj.irq.protests/index.html) demanding that the networks give more coverage to the peace movement. Now, do let me confess a prejudice. When someone "demands" anything of something they do not control or own, I tend to get very hostile to them. As I say, a personal bias to be considered. Recognizing that this is an international list, I want to make an observation about the true meaning of the "freedom of the press" guarantee of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. Freedom of the press, as I have always understood it, means that anyone who wants to can set up a press and print what they will. Freedom of the press does not mean that I can compel a publisher to present my views. These "demands" seem, to me, to fall into the second case. _I_ want to see CNN's content and decide for myself how credible it is. It might be glorifying war as did a samurai, but, as long as there are facts below the editorializing, I want to make my own decisions about the content. If the demonstrators interfered with CNN operations, I see them as no different than hacktivists defacing websites. If they are simply protesting the coverage, then they become much more like someone putting up an issue-oriented website. ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 23 Mar 2003 13:34:25 -0500 (EST) From: lindeman@bard.edu Subject: Re: [netz] A delicate line? Howard, > I've seen reporting of an incident that challenges on multiple levels. > > 1. What are the boundaries of "the net" with respect to netizenship? > Are commercial television and radio part of the net? We can > certainly communicate with them electronically as never in the > past, with email feedback. I'm having trouble getting my head around the question. No, I don't think that TV and radio are "part of the net." But certainly I'm concerned about trends in media concentration, and I'm interested in how Net-based media play off against those trends. Am I being too literal? > 2. What are the lines of demanding "content correctness" from a source > of information? Where do freedom of expression and of journalistic > (including alternate media) integrity arise? [Account snipped.] On the first part of this question, you've drawn one line very reasonably, I think. Anyone can beef at CNN, but they are not obviously entitled to try to shut down (or to coerce) CNN [and, like you, I have no idea whether there was any effort to interfere with CNN's operations]. I said "not obviously," not "obviously not," because I'm sure someone believes that shutting down CNN would be a defensible revolutionary act -- and it's not for me to say that that is _obviously_ wrong. But it seems pretty silly to me. I have no idea whether the demonstrators were asking CNN for anything that would compromise CNN's journalistic integrity. The phrase "content correctness" evokes "political correctness," which is generally understood as self-censorship (enforced through social pressure as necessary) of any improper ideas. I would guess that folks who are demonstrating against CNN aren't so much annoyed about what it is saying that it shouldn't, as what it isn't talking about that they believe it should be. A tangent: At Brown a few years ago, after the student newspaper ran a controversial advertisement opposing reparations to blacks (the controversy had to do with some of its other statements), a small student group threatened reprisals against the paper unless it apologized, paid reparations, and (as I vaguely recall) temporarily changed its name from the _Brown Daily Herald_ to, perhaps, the _White Daily Herald_. The staff of course refused, and the group went around campus destroying one daily run of the paper. I found this not only distasteful but embarrassing. Probably not an actual threat to freedom of discourse at Brown (I'd guess that the paper got a considerable short-run readership boost), but utterly misguided as a strategy -- in part because it really was an attempt to enforce "content correctness." Anyway, trying to think both as a netizen and as a political pragmatist, I am more interested in efforts to build a credible independent media than in complaints about CNN. I'm not saying that people shouldn't complain to CNN; the major media obviously play a large role in our political discourse, and the media shouldn't expect people always to defer to their judgments. (I remember CNN getting slammed from the right during Gulf War I.) Mark Lindeman ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 23 Mar 2003 14:19:42 -0500 From: "Howard C. Berkowitz" Subject: Re: [netz] A delicate line? >Howard, > >> I've seen reporting of an incident that challenges on multiple levels. >> >> 1. What are the boundaries of "the net" with respect to netizenship? >> Are commercial television and radio part of the net? We can >> certainly communicate with them electronically as never in the >> past, with email feedback. > >I'm having trouble getting my head around the question. No, I don't >think that >TV and radio are "part of the net." And that, in and of itself, is an assumption that needs close examination. First, do take into consideration my technical perspective that the net, first and foremost, is a tangible system of optics and electronics over which information flows. There are excellent technical and economic reasons to build "converged" networks, which gain economies of scale by moving telephony, video/television, etc., onto shared media. Those economies of scale have a direct relevance to the penetration of what I'll call the "social" (lousy term) net past the "digital divide." It may be too expensive to run separate facilities for telephones, cable TV, broadband access, etc. into a housing project, but it's been demonstrated that a combined link can be affordable. So, given those physical and economic realities, I do consider TV (perhaps radio less so) to be part of my definition of the net. _Not_ considering it such may perpetuate the digital divide. >But certainly I'm concerned about trends >in media concentration, and I'm interested in how Net-based media play off >against those trends. Am I being too literal? > >> 2. What are the lines of demanding "content correctness" from a source >> of information? Where do freedom of expression and of journalistic > > (including alternate media) integrity arise? [Account snipped.] > > > >I have no idea whether the demonstrators were asking CNN for anything that >would compromise CNN's journalistic integrity. The phrase "content >correctness" evokes "political correctness," which is generally understood as >self-censorship (enforced through social pressure as necessary) of >any improper >ideas. I would guess that folks who are demonstrating against CNN aren't so >much annoyed about what it is saying that it shouldn't, as what it isn't >talking about that they believe it should be. Again, this is fruit for discussion--I don't have the answer, but I contend that content correctness is a generic demand for outside parties to have control over what does not -- or does -- get into the delivered content. This becomes especially complex when it can be argued that a media outlet is in some manner subsidized by use of the "commons" with respect to radio frequency space and the like. One obvious area of exploration here is the effect, at least in the US, of the effect of cost of political television advertising on the integrity of the political process. That integrity potentially is challenged both by the need of the candidates to generate advertising dollars if they are to be competitive, and the impact of often-unaccountable soft money and issue campaigns. > >A tangent: At Brown a few years ago, after the student newspaper ran a >controversial advertisement opposing reparations to blacks (the >controversy had >to do with some of its other statements), a small student group threatened >reprisals against the paper unless it apologized, paid reparations, and (as I >vaguely recall) temporarily changed its name from the _Brown Daily Herald_ to, >perhaps, the _White Daily Herald_. The staff of course refused, and the group >went around campus destroying one daily run of the paper. I found this not >only distasteful but embarrassing. Probably not an actual threat to >freedom of >discourse at Brown (I'd guess that the paper got a considerable short-run >readership boost), but utterly misguided as a strategy -- in part because it >really was an attempt to enforce "content correctness." Let me make an emotional, unreasoned response here. I wouldn't trust myself to be peaceful toward "bookburners", regardless of their ideology. Going back to the late sixties, I remember well dealing with radicals spouting about "reprisals" and "demands", and somehow losing interest in threatening me or blocking access to my classroom when they looked into my eyes, felt my breath on their face, and realized that they were facing reality -- and consequences they weren't prepared to accept. Again completely anecdotal, but I remember well a time when I was trying my best to be an objective journalist at major antiwar demonstrations -- I was accredited by both sides and tried to be fair and honest to all. At one point, one protester was trying his best to slam my head into the concrete wall of the Pentagon -- in other words, something that very well could have been fatal. The revolutionary theorists' distinction between "force" and "violence" was very irrelevant in that moment. I took the physical action necessary to defend myself, and not with "minimum force" but with force adequate to be certain that individual was not in any condition to endanger me further. I was neither sending messages nor trying to maim or kill, but intending to disable -- and did. Almost 40 years later, I have no regrets over my actions. > >Anyway, trying to think both as a netizen and as a political pragmatist, I am >more interested in efforts to build a credible independent media than in >complaints about CNN. My model may be closer to building _analytical_ independence than _source_ independence. I believe that the Netizen has to realize that virtually any source is going to have biases, whether "independent" or not. >I'm not saying that people shouldn't complain to CNN; >the major media obviously play a large role in our political >discourse, and the >media shouldn't expect people always to defer to their judgments. (I remember >CNN getting slammed from the right during Gulf War I.) As long as commercial media are getting slammed from both sides, they are probably doing something right! ------------------------------ End of Netizens-Digest V1 #440 ******************************