Netizens-Digest Tuesday, March 11 2003 Volume 01 : Number 432 Netizens Association Discussion List Digest In this issue: Re: [netz] "Equiaccessibility" of access Re: [netz] Democracy and Persuasive Metric Design Re: [netz] Democracy ( was: Representation....) Re: [netz] "Equiaccessibility" of access Re: [netz] Democracy and Persuasive Metric Design ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2003 00:11:32 -0500 From: "Howard C. Berkowitz" Subject: Re: [netz] "Equiaccessibility" of access >In a message dated 3/10/03 11:57:23 AM Eastern Standard Time, >lindeman@bard.edu writes: > >>Howard, >> >>You lost me when you went into pneumothorax (hmm, that doesn't sound >>quite right...), but I think you're onto something here. >> >>>The matter of accessibility to experts, and their appropriate use, >>>might also lead to thinking about something about which I don't have a >>>good name -- indepenent review, democracy-by-proxy, etc. >>> >>>Here's the underlying issue. Getting deeply into some issues simply >>>requires substantial background. Even if large numbers of people >>>disagree with some position, in the words of Scotty from the original >>>Star Trek, "Ye canna ignore the laws of physics." >> >>This reminds me of a broad discourse on the politics of science and >>technology which basically poses the question, How can we have >>democratic control of science and technology when the vast majority of >>people don't understand the facts -- and never will? This isn't just a >>rant about scientific illiteracy, although the extent of that is >>disturbing. Even the best informed among us have enormous zones of >>absolute ignorance, and areas of dangerously little knowledge. [It's >>debatable whether science and technology issues are actually distinctive >>in these respects, but to me that debate seems moot.] >> >>Mark >> > > >Mark, we're working on this problem. I've volunteered some ideas >regarding the concept of 'constituent lobbyist' as the solution to >(1) large-scale unwieldy raw data processing management and (2) the >enhancement of general 'polemic intelligence' (so that constructive >and meaningful arguments can take place). The 'constituent >lobbyist' is my derivation of the 'expert' that Howard has been >talking about. > >The 'equiaccessiblity' to information is the problem that has to be >solved for the purpose of achieving a meaningful 'polemic >intercourse' between the constituent lobbyist and the elected >official's expert. > >Understand that there is a lot of information that can be kept >legally or otherwise from the public eye by the elected or appointed >official as an expedient to 'getting things done.' You might want >to read about the ruses of the master strategician, Robert Moses >(New York State politics). You do not even have to go that far. >Understand that the public cannot get access to the MTA budget to be >able to assess the necessity of a New York City transit fare hike. >Only Governor Pataki has this information. > >Therefore in this case, there can be no intelligent polemic. All of >your experts are either on the MTA board of directors or are the >Governor's deputies. > >You can have as many town meetings about the issue as you want. The >opposing side has no information. The transit fare hike will occur >uncontested -- a fait accompli. Perhaps, perhaps not. Lots of things can be two-edged swords. For many years, one of the major stars in the firmament of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence was the Office of Economic Research. A great deal of data on the Soviet and Chinese economies came from econometric models they developed, which were refined whenever possible with observational data. I suggest there might be network-enabled, "guided grass roots" ways of getting at these figures in a domestic situation without the special problems, say, of determining military budgets. While we might not know the full MTA budget, we should be able to construct a first approximation. The nice thing is that we may not need exotic intelligence collection, but citizen observation and analysis of data. For example, bus, train, etc., schedules are public information. By observation, possibly using sampling, it's possible to find out if the scheduled resources are on schedule (or more or less show up), the utilization of resources when seen, etc. From utilization and public fares, we have at least a substantial estimate of revenue. It should be possible to get approximations of at least some other forms of revenue, such as advertising on transit vehicles, rentals from concessionaires, etc. We have at least list prices and comparison with other jurisdictions to know a first approximation of the capital and operating expense of the resources. We know how many people operate them, and, from public union and other contracts, we have a basic idea of salaries and benefits. There is industry experience on maintenance costs for various vehicles, there is fuel consumption information and information on the price of the fuel in the spot market, etc. Using weather data on the net is a substantial input to calculating fuel consumption and equipment maintenance requirements, with appropriate expert input. Citizens can walk selected routes and determine needs for repair, and either industry or local contractors can give repair cost estimates. Without going through a full design, which I couldn't do by myself, I suggest that net-enabled collaboration, access to resources, etc., might very well create new possibiities for such things as "shadow budgets" to be constructed and used as a challenge to those demanding a fare hike. Either the official budget might be made suspect, or there might be adequate public and media pressure to force disclosure. > >Larry ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2003 00:18:36 -0500 From: "Howard C. Berkowitz" Subject: Re: [netz] Democracy and Persuasive Metric Design >DESIGN OF PERSUASIVE METRICS FOR CONSTITUENT REPRESENTATION: > >In a message dated 3/10/03 9:25:26 AM Eastern Standard Time, >hcb@gettcomm.com writes: > >> >In a message dated 3/9/03 10:36:44 PM Eastern Standard Time, >>>ronda@panix.com writes: >>> >>>>I don't disagree that legislation would be better if more people >>>>were involved in helping to clarify what is needed. >> >> A few semi-random thoughts. >> > >>>If we can all agree on this point, I believe we would be >>>experiencing a profound breakthrough, no matter the interpretation. >>> >>>Larry >> >>I applaud broader-based participation. My concerns lie variously in: >> >> -- the ability of charismatic grass-roots leaders to hijack positions. >> Do note that there are techniques, such as the Delphi method, to >> elicit information from all. The potential limitation of these >> techniques is they tend to require a trusted moderator/facilitator. >> -- no one interferes technically with the process of information exchange >> (e.g., hacktivism and spamming can do so) >> -- the logistics work -- assuming (and I don't see how we can do otherwise) >> that the unstructured people actually make and enforce decisions, >> there are ways to convey their consensus to decisionmakers in a >> manner that well-intentioned decisionmakers can use, rather than >> be flooded in raw data. >> -- issue discussions remain many and specifically focused, rather than >> becoming broad fronts that co-opt positions. >> > > >I agree that, for example, Logistics is going to be a problem >because I cannot envision any way that one can impose an >architecture of communication uniformly and be equally efficacious >in all constituent communities at any particular resolution were we >able to design a metric and a canonical representation, just >speaking 'offhand,' so that we could impose a method 'oranges to >oranges.' Avoid the apples. Didn't work well as a decisionmaking technique in the Garden of Eden. :-) > >Not that we must have uniformity, but uniformity it would seem would >generally make a design more economical to realize from a >centralized management perspective. It looks like there is going to >have to be a different approach for each case, where a 'case' >represents the trajectory of issue review from the most local >representation to the highest appropriate level for, of course, the >purpose of resolution. > >Case resolution, considered across 'oranges,' will be complicated by >issues like: > >i. Some elected representatives are more experienced and adept at >piping needs to appropriate committees and generally getting things >done and bartering 'support for support' at the legislative level >than others. Compromise and general politicking (between >politicians) takes talent and charisma always helps. Moreover this >disparity of talent will occur at varying levels of representation >from city government to state to federal. This also leads to scenarios where some elected representatives could be extremely adept in working with alternative systems. Such people could either become a new generation of responsive representative, but there's also a danger they could co-opt the process. > >ii. Consider, from the people side, that at each level of >'constituent resolution' you probably have to have a separate >'constituent lobbyist' on retainer -- that expert that knows not >only the topic, but has the utilitarian skill to traverse the >channels local to him to get the position seriously considered above >the fray. > >This series of 'constituent lobbyists' must be networked to be able >to communicate with agility across the 'constituent resolution' >levels from low to high to coordinate 'issue resolution.' I'm not visualizing what you have in mind as the "graph" of levels. Are you thinking of experts at providing data and eliciting opinion at various level of representation ("political/polemic/constituent process consultants"), at different levels of specialized knowledge ("subject matter experts"), ad hoc teams of the two, or what? One of the challenges -- or maybe it isn't!! -- is whether we are creating a counterweight to the existing system, or if we are creating a parallel government structure. I'm not necessarily for or against either, but I'd like us to be more clear about the problem we are trying to solve. > >Just to clarify, the expert 'constituent lobbyist' was my >interpretation of Howard's concept -- one of the solutions that >dealt with the raw data problem and the issue of what I dubbed >'polemic intelligence.' > >As far as the case that the following are legitimate concerns: > >H>-- the ability of charismatic grass-roots leaders to hijack positions. > >H>-- issue discussions remain many and specifically focused, rather than >H> becoming broad fronts that co-opt positions. > >-- I believe it would be fruitful and pragmatic to figure out a way >to harness this 'desultory' energy instead of working against it. Could you try another phrasing? I'm not sure what you mean by desultory energy. Or are your next 2-3 paragraphs that definition? > >Aren't there any Far Eastern philosophies that basically state this? > >I agree that it is definitely natural to expect that these behaviors >will happen. The idea is to construct a method to channel or tap >the unfocused energy to achieve the ultimate goal. In the end, who >cares how the goal was reached, as long as it was the one originally >intended? I do agree about the co-opting concern. Depending upon >the other 'muck' that is co-opted as the 'broad brushing' occurs, >the action may cause one to drop support due to what might be >considered as perverse identifications. > >Although the issues of management of scale of constituent feedback >by the elected representative is confronted by the 'lobbyist,' we >still have to deal with constituent participation. Constituent >participation must be measured somehow so that the lobbyist is >perceived as legitimately representing the local constituency. >Otherwise we would have made the situation worse by effectively >creating fewer voices of dissent and there would be no means for the >public to remonstrate. > >Our representation metric would probably be based on a recognized >retainer payment schedule, where the lobbyist is getting financially >compensated by the constituency. Everyone knows how much the >retainer contract is potentially worth versus its present cash >value. That way when the lobbyist speaks, the words are truly >meaningful. > >The elected representative can assess the inverse ratio of >'potential retainer contract value' to 'present cash value' and know >whether or not to give him an ear as the ratio approaches unity. > >I know this sounds wrong, but what can you do? Liberty is not free. >Please come up with some other persuasive metric. It may sound >stupid. I am just musing extemporaneously. > >Larry ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2003 11:55:09 -0500 From: Mark Lindeman Subject: Re: [netz] Democracy ( was: Representation....) Ronda, I'm pulling together a few pieces of your comments to me and to Howard. --I'm trying to sketch a framework of why you and I seem to have the same inconclusive conversation every few years; if we're clear about each other's views, perhaps we can spend more time on other issues. To me: >It isn't that everybody will want to have a "say" on "every aspect of >legislation". But it is that people need to have a way to have >such a say when they want to be involved. > >The Internet's development provides a model of such processes. > >And Usenet does as well. > >Both the early development of Usenet and more recent processes. > >I have written some about these. And Michael documents some of >this. > >For example, the fact that people can start a newsgroup or >a mailing list on a topic, means that people can influence >what is discussed. The contributions to the list mean people >are making up the content of what is developed. > >This is a grassroots process. > >Also Usenet has a process for voting for newsgroups. And there >is a means for discussion before the vote. > >There are lessons to be learned from this process, as well as >problems with the process. > >But it is that people can both contribute to the discussion, >and then vote, if one wants to . > >When this has functioned, I have found that though people seemed >to disagree during the early discussion, later in the discussion >it was clear that people did pay attention to what was said and >incorporated the ideas into their processes. Then when the vote >took place, there was an indication that the discussion affected >the vote. > >So the online world does provide experience to draw on in >trying to create a more democratic set of governing processes. > >But as another researcher noted, it takes hard work on a number >of people's parts to create and support such democratic processes. > To Howard: >But voting is the last, and perhaps not needed, when a good >solution is found to a problem. > >And it is the broad inclusion of information and processing >of that information that can make it possible to find that >solution. > I strongly support the contributions of the online world to democratic deliberation. And it is sometimes possible for the interested parties to agree that a solution is "a good solution." In politics, more often it is the case that interested parties may agree that any of several solutions would be better than the status quo, but they cannot necessarily agree on which one to adopt -- because their interests and/or values are irreconciliably opposed. This does not mean that no action can be taken; it means that there must be some decision rule, some way of deciding which way to go. (Or one can live with the inferior status quo, hoping that people's understandings of their values or interests will change. Sometimes those understandings do change, although I see no reason to assume that they will always converge.) I agree with Habermas that voting is at most a caesura to deliberation, not a substitute for (or even an ultimate end to) deliberation. I do not want to be cast as reducing democracy to "one person, one vote." But since we already have open, unfettered discussion on any policy issue anyone cares to discuss, it does seem that if we don't actually change the decision rules -- well, I won't say that "nothing will change," because I do think that anything that influences the quality of societal deliberation is likely eventually to affect policy. But I don't _think_ you'll be singing hosannas until the formal rules of policymaking change substantially. And I am not convinced that anything in the RFC process, voting for newsgroups, or any other part of the really existing Net provides much guidance on how to do this. That's OK; it is not incumbent on you to provide a blueprint, and perhaps not even useful. But for the time being and for the foreseeable future -- please correct me if I am missing something important -- we are working within a political system where the formal rules of policymaking implement representation, not direct democracy. Now, it seems to me that some people fundamentally like the idea of representation, some people fundamentally dislike it, and some people are more or less resigned to it. [Speaking broadly -- we don't actually have to categorize folks.] We can consider the Net's possible contributions to democratic deliberation without having to agree whether the goal is to improve representation or to supplant it. In some cases, our differences in goals will cause us to differ on the means -- but in many cases not. Mark ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2003 11:57:34 -0500 From: Mark Lindeman Subject: Re: [netz] "Equiaccessibility" of access AGENTKUENSTLER@aol.com wrote in small part: > Mark, we're working on this problem. [...] Yeah, I know. I'll stick in my oar if I think I have something really useful to add [or if I just can't resist!?]. I think you're doing pretty well so far. Mark ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2003 23:26:15 EST From: AGENTKUENSTLER@aol.com Subject: Re: [netz] Democracy and Persuasive Metric Design - --part1_62.2e07b328.2ba010e7_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In a message dated 3/11/03 12:19:20 AM Eastern Standard Time,=20 hcb@gettcomm.com writes: > L>I agree that, for example, Logistics is going to be a problem=20 > L>because I cannot envision any way that one can impose an=20 > L>architecture of communication uniformly and be equally efficacious=20 > L>in all constituent communities at any particular resolution were we=20 > L>able to design a metric and a canonical representation, just=20 > L>speaking 'offhand,' so that we could impose a method 'oranges to=20 > L>oranges.'=20 >=20 > H>Avoid the apples. Didn't work well as a decisionmaking technique in=20 > H>the Garden of Eden. :-) >=20 I got a chuckle out of that. L>Case resolution, considered across 'oranges,' will be complicated by=20 L>issues like: L> L>i.=A0 Some elected representatives are more experienced and adept at=20 L>piping needs to appropriate committees and generally getting things=20 L>done and bartering 'support for support' at the legislative level=20 L>than others.=A0 Compromise and general politicking (between=20 L>politicians) takes talent and charisma always helps.=A0 Moreover this=20 L>disparity of talent will occur at varying levels of representation=20 L>from city government to state to federal.=20 H>This also leads to scenarios where some elected representatives could=20 H>be extremely adept in working with alternative systems. Such people=20 H>could either become a new generation of responsive representative,=20 H>but there's also a danger they could co-opt the process. Is that a good or a bad thing?=20 L>ii.=A0 Consider, from the people side, that at each level of=20 L>'constituent resolution' you probably have to have a separate=20 L>'constituent lobbyist' on retainer -- that expert that knows not=20 L>only the topic, but has the utilitarian skill to traverse the=20 L>channels local to him to get the position seriously considered above=20 L>the fray.=20 L> L>This series of 'constituent lobbyists' must be networked to be able=20 L>to communicate with agility across the 'constituent resolution'=20 L>levels from low to high to coordinate 'issue resolution.' H>I'm not visualizing what you have in mind as the "graph" of levels.=20 H>Are you thinking of experts at providing data and eliciting opinion=20 H>at various level of representation ("political/polemic/constituent=20 H>process consultants"), at different levels of specialized knowledge=20 H>("subject matter experts"), ad hoc teams of the two, or what? Please forgive me. By levels, I mean to refer to a particular sequence K' o= f=20 constituency sets meaningfully constructed in such a way that each level is=20= a=20 proper subset of the next element of the sequence such that C( i ) < C( j )=20 when i < j. C( x ), identified with K', is a set, not a function; x is an=20 index. Forgive me, there is no mathematica here. This hastily made=20 construction is meant to provide a means of illustrating the architecture=20 upon which we can consider the trajectory of issue resolution from local=20 government to federal government. Each level or set C of a unique K' has=20 associated with it an elected official. C is the maximal set of constituent= s=20 that that official represents. =20 What I meant to say is that at each level there probably will have to be a=20 distinct expert (constituency lobbyist) on retainer to be a liason to that=20 elected official's office. Why? Because we are dealing with people here,=20 not machines. From my experience in life, not everybody listens to reason a= n d often it is not because your reasoning is false but because of silly thing= s=20 like the recipient does not like you (even when you are proven effective). =20 Anyways, the local expert at a particular level has to know how to massage=20 the right people in the office to get things done. Few people have the=20 talent to effectively blandish everyone they meet and definitely not=20 'eggheads.' H>One of the challenges -- or maybe it isn't!! -- is whether we are=20 H>creating a counterweight to the existing system, or if we are=20 H>creating a parallel government structure. I'm not necessarily for or=20 H>against either, but I'd like us to be more clear about the problem we=20 H>are trying to solve. I hope I am not intimating that we are to create a parallel government=20 structure as a solution. I guess I'm struggling with the issue of how to=20 make this (constituency lobbyist) idea meaningful. I want to work within th= e=20 system. Unfortunately, I see this as solving some problems and creating=20 others. My fear is that the expert begins to look like he or she is acting=20 alone because the public will revert to the 'government on autopilot' state.= =20 How do you make the 'constituency lobbyist' representation meaningful? By=20 far, the public prefers the 'government on autopilot after the election' kin= d=20 of participation, which of course is a nonexistent participation. =20 People fail to understand that their obligation does not end at the voting=20 booth. Given the way people are, you probably have to get them to buy into the=20 lobbyist as 'liberty insurance'. When you pay, you get your major issues=20 resolved before they become real problems. Payment is a much simpler=20 participation than going to town meetings; it reflects the culture of a=20 people (Americans) who prefer to be detached from government -- from each=20 other. =20 In this model, you have to demonstrate constituent participation in some way= =20 to make the lobbyist legitimate to the local official. It has to be clear=20 that the expert is speaking on behalf of all of the constituency. You are=20 already considered illegitimate if the local official has to ask, 'Are you=20 really speaking for all of my people, or are you speaking for yourself or=20 maybe a radical segment of my people, or are you being compensated by a=20 phantom entity.' Make it clear. The way to do that is to demonstrate that you are getting=20 compensated in some way by all of the constituency. If people are paying th= e=20 lobbyist, that implies that what is being said represents closely what the=20 sponsors intend to say. The greater the percentage return of 'contribution'= =20 from the constituency, the more credible the lobbyist becomes to the elected= =20 official. I articulated this yesterday with: L>Although the issues of management of scale of constituent feedback=20 L>by the elected representative is confronted by the 'lobbyist,' we=20 L>still have to deal with constituent participation.=A0 Constituent=20 L>participation must be measured somehow so that the lobbyist is=20 L>perceived as legitimately representing the local constituency.=20 L>Otherwise we would have made the situation worse by effectively=20 L>creating fewer voices of dissent and there would be no means for the=20 L>public to remonstrate. L> L>Our representation metric would probably be based on a recognized=20 L>retainer payment schedule, where the lobbyist is getting financially=20 L>compensated by the constituency.=A0 Everyone knows how much the=20 L>retainer contract is potentially worth versus its present cash=20 L>value.=A0 That way when the lobbyist speaks, the words are truly=20 L>meaningful.=20 L> L>The elected representative can assess the inverse ratio of=20 L>'potential retainer contract value' to 'present cash value' and know=20 L>whether or not to give him an ear as the ratio approaches unity. L> L>I know this sounds wrong, but what can you do?=A0 Liberty is not free.=20 L>Please come up with some other persuasive metric.=A0 It may sound=20 L>stupid.=A0 I am just musing extemporaneously. L> L>Larry Larry - --part1_62.2e07b328.2ba010e7_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In a message dated 3/11/03 12:19:20 AM Eastern Standar= d Time, hcb@gettcomm.com writes:

L>I agree that, for example,= Logistics is going to be a problem
L>because I cannot envision any way that one can impose an
L>architecture of communication uniformly and be equally efficacious
L>in all constituent communities at any particular resolution were we L>able to design a metric and a canonical representation, just
L>speaking 'offhand,' so that we could impose a method 'oranges to
L>oranges.'

H>Avoid the apples. Didn't work well as a decisionmaking technique in H>the Garden of Eden. :-)


I got a chuckle out of that.

L>Case resolution, considered across 'oranges,' will be complicated by L>issues like:
L>
L>i.=A0 Some elected representatives are more experienced and adept at L>piping needs to appropriate committees and generally getting things L>done and bartering 'support for support' at the legislative level
L>than others.=A0 Compromise and general politicking (between
L>politicians) takes talent and charisma always helps.=A0 Moreover this <= BR> L>disparity of talent will occur at varying levels of representation
L>from city government to state to federal.

H>This also leads to scenarios where some elected representatives could <= BR> H>be extremely adept in working with alternative systems. Such people H>could either become a new generation of responsive representative,
H>but there's also a danger they could co-opt the process.

Is that a good or a bad thing?

L>ii.=A0 Consider, from the people side, that at each level of
L>'constituent resolution' you probably have to have a separate
L>'constituent lobbyist' on retainer -- that expert that knows not
L>only the topic, but has the utilitarian skill to traverse the
L>channels local to him to get the position seriously considered above L>the fray.
L>
L>This series of 'constituent lobbyists' must be networked to be able L>to communicate with agility across the 'constituent resolution'
L>levels from low to high to coordinate 'issue resolution.'

H>I'm not visualizing what you have in mind as the "graph" of levels. H>Are you thinking of experts at providing data and eliciting opinion H>at various level of representation ("political/polemic/constituent
H>process consultants"), at different levels of specialized knowledge H>("subject matter experts"), ad hoc teams of the two, or what?

Please forgive me.  By levels, I mean to refer to a particular sequence= K' of constituency sets meaningfully constructed in such a way that each le= vel is a proper subset of the next element of the sequence such that C( i )=20= < C( j ) when i < j. C( x ), identified with K', is a set, not a funct= ion; x is an index.  Forgive me, there is no mathematica here.  Th= is hastily made construction is meant to provide a means of illustrating the= architecture upon which we can consider the trajectory of issue resolution=20= from local government to federal government.  Each level or set C of a=20= unique K' has associated with it an elected official.  C is the maximal= set of constituents that that official represents. 

What I meant to say is that at each level there probably will have to be a d= istinct expert (constituency lobbyist) on retainer to be a liason to that el= ected official's office.  Why?  Because we are dealing with people= here, not machines.  From my experience in life, not everybody listens= to reason and often it is not because your reasoning is false but because o= f silly things like the recipient does not like you (even when you are prove= n effective).  Anyways, the local expert at a particular level has to k= now how to massage the right people in the office to get things done. =20= Few people have the talent to effectively blandish everyone they meet and de= finitely not 'eggheads.'

H>One of the challenges -- or maybe it isn't!! -- is whether we are
H>creating a counterweight to the existing system, or if we are
H>creating a parallel government structure. I'm not necessarily for or H>against either, but I'd like us to be more clear about the problem we <= BR> H>are trying to solve.

I hope I am not intimating that we are to create a parallel government struc= ture as a solution.  I guess I'm struggling with the issue of how to ma= ke this (constituency lobbyist) idea meaningful.  I want to work within= the system.  Unfortunately, I see this as solving some problems and cr= eating others.  My fear is that the expert begins to look like he or sh= e is acting alone because the public will revert to the 'government on autop= ilot' state.  How do you make the 'constituency lobbyist' representatio= n meaningful?  By far, the public prefers the 'government on autopilot=20= after the election' kind of participation, which of course is a nonexistent=20= participation. 

People fail to understand that their obligation does not end at the voting b= ooth.

Given the way people are, you probably have to get them to buy into the lobb= yist as 'liberty insurance'.  When you pay, you get your major issues r= esolved before they become real problems.  Payment is a much simpler pa= rticipation than going to town meetings; it reflects the culture of a people= (Americans) who prefer to be detached from government -- from each other.&n= bsp;

In this model, you have to demonstrate constituent participation in some way= to make the lobbyist legitimate to the local official.  It has to be c= lear that the expert is speaking on behalf of all of the constituency. = You are already considered illegitimate if the local official has to ask, '= Are you really speaking for all of my people, or are you speaking for yourse= lf or maybe a radical segment of my people, or are you being compensated by=20= a phantom entity.'

Make it clear.  The way to do that is to demonstrate that you are getti= ng compensated in some way by all of the constituency.  If people are p= aying the lobbyist, that implies that what is being said represents closely=20= what the sponsors intend to say.  The greater the percentage return of=20= 'contribution' from the constituency, the more credible the lobbyist becomes= to the elected official.

I articulated this yesterday with:

L>Although the issues of management of scale of constituent feedback
L>by the elected representative is confronted by the 'lobbyist,' we
L>still have to deal with constituent participation.=A0 Constituent
L>participation must be measured somehow so that the lobbyist is
L>perceived as legitimately representing the local constituency.
L>Otherwise we would have made the situation worse by effectively
L>creating fewer voices of dissent and there would be no means for the L>public to remonstrate.
L>
L>Our representation metric would probably be based on a recognized
L>retainer payment schedule, where the lobbyist is getting financially L>compensated by the constituency.=A0 Everyone knows how much the
L>retainer contract is potentially worth versus its present cash
L>value.=A0 That way when the lobbyist speaks, the words are truly
L>meaningful.
L>
L>The elected representative can assess the inverse ratio of
L>'potential retainer contract value' to 'present cash value' and know L>whether or not to give him an ear as the ratio approaches unity.
L>
L>I know this sounds wrong, but what can you do?=A0 Liberty is not free.=20=
L>Please come up with some other persuasive metric.=A0 It may sound
L>stupid.=A0 I am just musing extemporaneously.
L>
L>Larry

Larry - --part1_62.2e07b328.2ba010e7_boundary-- ------------------------------ End of Netizens-Digest V1 #432 ******************************